Why Hayek is not a conservative, again

This is an exercise in comparison, suggested by a Kenneth Anderson post on Volokh, in which the following passage from Burke's Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs is first quoted:

Dark and inscrutable are the ways by which we come into the world. The instincts which give rise to this mysterious process of nature are not of our making. But out of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps unknowable, arise moral duties, which, as we are able perfectly to comprehend, we are bound indispensably to perform. Parents may not be consenting to their moral relation; but consenting or not, they are bound to a long train of burthensome duties towards those with whom they have never made a convention of any sort. Children are not consenting to their relation, but their relation, without their actual consent, binds them to its duties; or rather it implies their consent because the presumed consent of every rational creature is in unison with the predisposed order of things. Men come in that manner into a community with the social state of their parents, endowed with all the benefits, loaded with all the duties of their situation. If the social ties and ligaments, spun out of those physical relations which are the elements of the commonwealth, in most cases begin, and always continue, independently of our will, so without any stipulation, on our part, are we bound by that relation called our country, which comprehends (as it has been well said) “all the charities of all.” Nor are we left without powerful instincts to make this duty as dear and grateful to us, as it is awful and coercive.

 And then the question of whether or not it's "consistent" with Hayek is posed. My answer, which I've largely copied from a comment on the post but expanded, is as follows:

The Burke passage deliberately runs together a couple of things that should have been kept distinct. First, as many have pointed out, he conflates a child’s duty to his parents with a citizen’s duty to her state, as though the state really were a kind of parent figure and the citizens permanent juveniles. And second, he mixes moral with legal obligation, as though the state could legitimately coerce any sort of good behavior.

Hayek, I think, would understand and appreciate the idea that there are many aspects of tradition, custom, even common law, that have evolved for reasons we don’t necessarily fully grasp, and that we should therefore be cautious about abandoning or overturning. But he would also say that we can’t stop there, because there are also many aspects of our cultural inheritance that are remnants of earlier superstition, ignorance, and bigotry. And he wouldn’t have made the sort of rhetorical confusions above, that Burke indulges too readily.

Liberty, the knowledge problem, and social evolution

We've seen that Jim Manzi's distinction between liberty-as-goal and liberty-as-means libertarianisms runs into some immediate problems and false paradoxes. Better to contrast dogmatic libertarianism with a pragmatic version, that aims simply to increase liberty in an incremental, experimental manner. But there are deeper issues involved in the notion of liberty, both as goal and means, that Manzi also raises, though again in a somewhat tangled fashion.

The first of these is the famous "knowledge problem" (see, e.g., Hayek's "The Use of Knowledge in Society"), which can take various forms, but can be expressed as the idea that the dispersion of decision-making power amongst the individuals affected by decisions takes maximum advantage of their knowledge of their own circumstances. In this sense, we might say that liberty -- that is, the dispersion of decision-making power -- is a means to the end of maximizing individual well-being, in whatever way individuals define it. But this, by its emphasis on the individual's definition of her own well-being, and by its very generality, comes quite close at least to being equivalent to simply making liberty a goal -- we might say that it helps explain why liberty is a goal.

Manzi may be alluding to something like this in his assertion that "We need liberty ... because we are so ignorant of what works in practical, material terms". But, in bypassing the individual emphasis, it misses a critical aspect of the issue, and leads him into the false paradox noted earlier, where liberty, and the ignorance it addresses, is apparently satisfied simply by dividing society into smaller units, each of which is "free" to be relatively repressive or anarchic.

But perhaps Manzi has in mind another kind of ignorance than the Hayekian notion of the dispersion of knowledge -- perhaps he's simply referring to the limits of human knowledge in general. Here, for example, are the sentences that preceded the quote above:

Liberty-as-means libertarianism sees the world in an evolutionary framework: societies evolve rules, norms, laws and so forth in order to adapt and survive in a complex and changing external environment. At a high level of abstraction, internal freedoms are necessary so that the society can learn (which requires trial-and-error learning because the external reality is believed to be too complex to be fully comprehended by any existing theory) and adapt (which is important because the external reality is changing).

 And here (finally) is a clear and important realization. Let's try to make its components even more explicit:

• First, social/cultural evolution is not something brought about by design -- by social engineers, policy-makers, or bureaucrats -- but rather by the same sort of random, trial-and-error processes that we see in the natural world; it's Darwinian, in other words, as opposed to Lamarckian. This isn't because human knowledge is futile but simply because it has limits, outside of which nature always waits and exerts her influence -- it's just that influence that appears as evolution, as distinct from, say, "improvement", "reform", "institutional design", "revolution", etc.
• But, second, such evolution isn't something distinct or apart from human agency, but rather consists of human decisions and actions, and of course of the consequences thereof. Manzi is right to point out, therefore, that the dispersal of decision-making power in the face of this sort of unavoidable ignorance confers a distinct evolutionary advantage on a society, in terms of the greater flexibility and adaptability it allows. There are, as he also points out, limits to this dispersal, or issues on which coercion is still an evolutionary advantage (e.g., obviously, laws against murder or theft, or, arguably, laws against prostitution), but everywhere the evolutionary logic is to disperse this power as far as possible, thereby extending the freedom of the individual agent. 

Hayek, Keynes and the Depression, then and now

First, a rap video -- the now famous one of course, that put what is still the fundamental political-economic debate of our times to rhyme :)



Then in that context, via a Johnathan Adler post on Volokh, a fascinating pair of Letters to the Editor of the Times, circa 1932, directly juxtaposing the two iconic economic figures (along with some famous names on backup too) debating in the early days of the Depression.

Speaking of which (the Depression), and that fateful year 1932, here's a Telegraph article from a few days ago: "With the US trapped in depression, this really is starting to feel like 1932".

Scary, no? Well, for Megan McArdle at least, Keynes -- in the sense of more spending -- is just a moot issue now anyway: "what if Lord Keynes was right . . . but only in 1932?".

And, in the context of all that, interest is rising in the fate of, of all places, Ireland, for its experiment with anti-Keynesian austerity:

• First, here's McArdle again, reacting to a widely noticed NY Times article full of foreboding for the little country: "American Austerity"
• Next, here's Tyler Cowan reacting to the same NY Times piece, but cautiously, noticing some good signs too: "When will we know if Irish pre-emptive fiscal austerity is a failure?"
• And finally (for now), here's Russ Roberts, of Cafe Hayek, juxtaposing two NY Times headlines and thereby finding some reasons for optimism: "All the news that fit to print (plus some more)"

We can only hope, as we wait to see history's outcome, that the suspense won't kill us.