Iraq, the media, and a dream Presidential candidate

The dream candidate is the one on the right (in both senses):

Thanks to SDA

Obama the neocon?

Probably not, but an editorial by Fred Hiatt, "Will Obama's foreign policy follow his new democracy rhetoric?", raises the possibility just enough that it lets me get in a plug for that prominent bogeyman of the left, that banner for the hideous Bush-Cheney foreign policy, necoconservatism.

This was -- and may still be -- a "third way", if you like, between two other strategic alternatives for foreign policy. On the one hand, there was the naive idealism/crass cynicism of "liberal internationalism", which was an attempt at a top-down imposition of order by creating the shells or facades of global institutions fluffed up with a lot of talk about "international law", etc., but behind which facades sheltered the worst sorts of despotisms and petty tyrannies engaged in the same old squabbles that states have always fought over. As a general strategy, it failed miserably the first time it was tried, with the League of Nations, and at least as miserably the second time, with the United Nations, except, of course, that nuclear weapons have preserved us from another world war. On the other hand, there is the older notion of realpolitik, exemplified by Kissinger, which at least has its realism, or attempt at realism, to save it from cynicism. But, even in Metternich's or Bismark's day, its lack of any moral principle other than national self-interest was never realistic enough in a long term sense, and fails all the more dismally today when nations and their economies are so much more tightly interlocked. So, on the third hand, we have the strategic approach known as neoconservatism, which views a truly realistic foreign policy as one guided by some long-range and general principles, such as democracy, the rule of law, and individual rights. Contrary to popular leftist opinion, this doesn't imply a policy of belligerent intervention and nation building in states that lack those principles now (except under exceptional conditions, where alternatives are worse), but instead a policy of positive encouragement and help, in a long-term effort to build a bottom-up world order chacteristized by peace and mutual prosperity.

Now, as I indicated, I don't hold out much hope that Obama even understands these kinds of distinctions -- not because he's stupid, but simply because his whole background indicates a kind of can't-we-all-just-get-along foreign policy naivete at best, and a lefty, America as the real "evil empire" mind set at worst. See this post summarizing Kenneth Anderson's take on the present Administration's underlying foreign policy assumptions for a more nuanced, but no less skeptical, analysis. But it would be nice to think that, regardless of the label used, and notwithstanding the forum in which they were uttered, words like these had some real "neoconservative" substance behind them:

The idea is a simple one -- that freedom, justice and peace for the world must begin with freedom, justice, and peace in the lives of individual human beings. And for the United States, this is a matter of moral and pragmatic necessity. As Robert Kennedy said, "the individual man, the child of God, is the touchstone of value, and all society, groups, the state, exist for his benefit." So we stand up for universal values because it's the right thing to do. But we also know from experience that those who defend these values for their people have been our closest friends and allies, while those who have denied those rights -- whether terrorist groups or tyrannical governments -- have chosen to be our adversaries....

 ...experience shows us that history is on the side of liberty; that the strongest foundation for human progress lies in open economies, open societies, and open governments. To put it simply, democracy, more than any other form of government, delivers for our citizens. And I believe that truth will only grow stronger in a world where the borders between nations are blurred.

Development: systems as distinct from aid

From Cafe Hayek comes a link to an interesting post on an even more interesting blog, called Aid Watch, with the tag line, "Just asking that aid benefit the poor". The post makes a distinction between "direct solutions to problems" and "problem-solving systems", and goes on to say why that's important:

Here’s why direct solutions to problems cannot foster development. Each direct solution depends on lots of other complementary factors, so the solutions can seldom be generalized across different settings; Solutions must fit each local context....

Development happens thanks to problem-solving systems. To vastly oversimplify for illustrative purposes, the market is a decentralized (private) problem solving system with rich feedback and accountability. Democracy, civil liberties, free speech, protection of rights of dissidents and activists is a decentralized (public) problem solving system with (imperfect) feedback and accountability. Individual liberty in general fosters systems that allow many different individuals to use their particular local knowledge and expertise to attempt many different independent trials at solutions. When you have a large number of independent trials, the probability of solutions goes way up.

Easterley, the author, provides a kind of qualification of his post near its end:

Direct solutions to problems (say, using aid programs) still may be worthwhile as benefiting a lot of people. But a long list of many such solutions is not development; development is the gradual emergence of a problem-solving system.

But that first sentence needs at least some elaboration or it undercuts his thesis -- e.g., direct solutions may be worthwhile only in the case where they don't depend of lots of other complementary factors.

Using aid, however, in an indirect manner, in order to foster problem-solving systems seems a much more promising strategy than we've generally been following to this point. Does that just get us back into a version of the "nation building" quagmire? Or could it mean that "nation building", when looked at in other than military terms, isn't so hopeless after all? Were/are the neocons right regarding long-term foreign policy objectives?